The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship
& the Law
Volume 8

Issue 1

Article 4

4-15-2015

Delaware Corporate Law Recognizes the Fundamental Validity of
the Forum Selection Bylaw: A Survey of the Boilermakers
Litigation
Zachary R. Cormier

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, and the Securities Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Zachary R. Cormier, Delaware Corporate Law Recognizes the Fundamental Validity of the Forum Selection
Bylaw: A Survey of the Boilermakers Litigation, 8 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 115 (2015)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel/vol8/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law by an
authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW
RECOGNIZES THE FUNDAMENTAL
VALIDITY OF THE FORUM SELECTION
BYLAW: A SURVEY OF THE
BOILERMAKERS LITIGATION
ZACHARY R. CORMIER
I. Introduction......................................................................................................... 116
II. Case Procedure and Background ....................................................................... 116
III. The Forum Selection Bylaws ........................................................................... 117
IV. Expressed Motivation for the Forum Selection Bylaws .................................. 118
V. The Plaintiffs’ Claims ....................................................................................... 119
VI. The Standard of Review and the Plaintiffs’ Hypothetical
Circumstances for Potential Unfairness ..................................................... 120
VII. Questions Answered: Unilaterally Adopted Forum Selection Bylaws
of This Kind Are Statutorily and Contractually Valid Under
Delaware Law ............................................................................................ 120
A. Statutory Validity: The Subject Matter of the Forum Selection
Bylaws Was Encompassed by the Broad Language of 8 Del.
C. Section 109(b) ............................................................................... 120
B. Contractual Validity: Forum Selection Clause Jurisprudence
Will Apply to the Forum Selection Bylaws Even Though They
Were Unilaterally Adopted by the Boards ......................................... 122
VIII. Questions That Remain for Future Courts: Do Forum Selection
Bylaws of This Kind Operate in a “Reasonable” Manner? ....................... 122
A. Survey of Forum Selection Clause Jurisprudence ................................ 123
B.Presumptive Validity .............................................................................. 123
C. Forum Selection Clauses Remain Broadly Enforceable Even
Without Bargaining Power or Negotiation ........................................ 124
D. Fundamental Fairness Scrutiny ............................................................. 124
IX. Application of Forum Selection Clause Reasonability and Fairness
Principles to a Forum Selection Bylaw of This Kind ................................ 125
A. The Court Refused to Apply Hypotheticals in a Facial Challenge ....... 126
B. The Unilateral Nature of a Forum Selection Bylaw Will Not
Render It Unreasonable or Fundamentally Unfair ............................. 126

116

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. VIII:I

C. Potential Fairness and Reasonability Applications Remain for
Future Cases ....................................................................................... 126
X. Conclusion......................................................................................................... 127

I. INTRODUCTION
Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.1 represents a
new and important chapter in the relationship between the forum selection
clause and modern business relations. A forum selection clause is “[a]
contractual provision in which the parties establish the place (such as the
country, state, or type of court) for specified litigation between them.”2 Forum
selection clauses have most often been analyzed by courts within contractual
relationships between businesses,3 or a business and its customers.4 The
Boilermakers case sets important precedent for forum selection in an equally
fundamental business relationship—the corporation and its stockholders.5 This
article will survey the key points of the Boilermakers case and, in so doing, will
hopefully complement the insightful conversation led by then Chief Justice
Myron Steele about the case at the Pepperdine University’s Journal of Business,
Entrepreneurship and the Law’s Fall 2013 symposium.
II. CASE PROCEDURE AND BACKGROUND
Forum selection clause provisions in corporate bylaws (forum selection
bylaws) are becoming commonplace. “Generally speaking, a forum selection
bylaw is a provision in a corporation’s bylaws that designates a forum as the
exclusive venue for certain stockholder suits against the corporation, either as an
actual or nominal defendant, and its directors and employees.”6 “In the last
three years, over 250 publicly traded corporations have adopted such
provisions.”7 The Boilermakers litigation stems from twelve such companies,
all of whom adopted similar forum selection bylaws in regards to corporate
governance suits by stockholders.8 Complaints were filed against each of these

1

Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
In re Oracle Corp., 399 Fed. App’x 587, 589 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 2009)).
3
See, e.g. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
4
See, e.g. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591 (1991).
5
Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 937−38.
6
Id. at 941−42.
7
Id. at 944 (citation omitted).
8
Id. at 944−45.
2
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companies to challenge such bylaws in the Court of Chancery of Delaware on
“substantively identical” grounds by the same law firm.9 “Ten of the twelve
defendant corporations repealed their bylaws,” prompting the respective
plaintiffs to dismiss their complaints.10 Defendants Chevron Corporation
(Chevron) and FedEx Corporation (FedEx), however, stood by such bylaws and
answered these complaints.11 The court consolidated the actions for the purpose
of deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Chevron and FedEx
regarding the facial validity of such bylaws.12
III. THE FORUM SELECTION BYLAWS
Delaware law provides the power to “adopt, amend[,] or repeal bylaws
shall be in the stockholders,” unless stockholders decide to place such power
within the hands of the corporation’s board of directors.13 The certificates of
incorporation for both Chevron and FedEx had so empowered their respective
boards.14 Using such authority, the boards for both Chevron and FedEx
unilaterally adopted an identical forum selection bylaw without stockholder
vote, which was similarly provided for in each corporation’s certificate of
incorporation.15 The bylaw read as follows:
Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an
alternative forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware
shall be the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or
proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action
asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director,
officer[,] or other employee of the Corporation to the Corporation or
the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim
arising pursuant to any provision of the Delaware General
Corporation Law, or (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by
the internal affairs doctrine. Any person or entity purchasing or
otherwise acquiring any interest in shares of capital stock of the
Corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and consented to the
provisions of this [bylaw].16
Chevron’s board eventually amended this bylaw to allow for suit in either
state or federal court in Delaware and limited the bylaw’s scope to only those
9

Id.
Id. at 945.
11
Id.
12
See id. at 938–39, 945–47.
13
Id. at 941 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2010)).
14
Id.
15
Id. at 941–42.
16
Id. at 942.
10
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cases where a Delaware court had personal jurisdiction over all “indispensable”
parties.17 Importantly, whereas both Chevron and FedEx are incorporated in
Delaware, Chevron is headquartered in California, and FedEx is headquartered
in Tennessee.18
The court made it a point to emphasize Chevron and FedEx were not
attempting to limit “what suits may be brought against the corporations, only
where internal governance suits may be brought.”19 The court quoted the
explanation given by Chevron and FedEx as to the four types of internal
corporate governance suits encompassed under the bylaw:
• Derivative suits. The issue of whether a derivative plaintiff is
qualified to sue on behalf of the corporation and whether that
derivative plaintiff has or is excused from making demand on the
board is a matter of corporate governance, because it goes to the
very nature of who may speak for the corporation.
• Fiduciary duty suits. The law of fiduciary duties regulates the
relationships between directors, officers, the corporation, and its
stockholders.
• D.G.C.L. suits. The Delaware General Corporation Law provides
the underpinning framework for all Delaware corporations. That
statute goes to the core of how such corporations are governed.
• Internal affairs suits. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained,
“internal affairs,” in the context of corporate law, are those “matters
peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and
its current officers, directors, and shareholders.”20
IV. EXPRESSED MOTIVATION FOR THE FORUM SELECTION BYLAWS
The boards of Chevron and FedEx explained they had adopted such forum
selection bylaws in an attempt to prevent the costs of “multiforum litigation” for
corporate governance claims.21 For purposes of corporate governance actions,
personal jurisdiction is available against the corporation and its board at least in
its incorporation state and its principal place of business—headquarters.22
Because many corporations like Chevron and FedEx have decided to incorporate
in Delaware and establish headquarters in another state, such corporations and
17
18
19
20
21
22

Id.
Id.
Id. at 943.
Id. at 942–43.
Id. at 943.
Id.
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their boards are subject to suits for one corporate action in both forums
simultaneously.23
Chevron and FedEx explained such simultaneous, multiforum litigation
imposes “needless” expenses, which amount to “high costs on the
corporation[].”24 Chevron and FedEx argued such costs create harm to the
investors and stockholders themselves, which are “not justified by rational
benefits for stockholders from multiforum filings.”25 As the court summarized,
“the boards of Chevron and FedEx claim to have tried to minimize or eliminate
the risk of what they view as wasteful[,] duplicative litigation by adopting the
forum selection bylaws.”26
V. THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS
Plaintiffs Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund, Key West Police and
Fire Pension Fund, and Iclub Investment Partnership (collectively, Plaintiffs)
had two claims, which were the subject of the motion for judgment on the
pleadings before the court.27 First, “[P]laintiffs claimed that the bylaws [were]
statutorily invalid because they [were] beyond the board’s authority under the
Delaware General Corporation Law . . .”—the statutory validity claim.28
Second, Plaintiffs claimed the forum selection bylaws cannot be enforced like
contractual forum selection clauses have historically been because the boards
unilaterally adopted such bylaws—the contractual validity claims.29 Essentially,
they claimed the forum selection clause jurisprudence, which has typically
analyzed a more traditional contractual situation, should not apply to the
proposed forum selection bylaws. In addition to these two specific claims, the
Plaintiffs made the broader argument the forum selection bylaws might operate
“unreasonably” under a myriad of hypothetical situations.30 As will be seen
below, this broader reasonability argument relates to the fundamental fairness of
a forum selection clause, which has traditionally been one particular focus of
analysis where forum selection clause jurisprudence is applied.31

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id.
Id. at 944.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 938.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part VI.
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VI. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND THE PLAINTIFFS’ HYPOTHETICAL
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR POTENTIAL UNFAIRNESS
Importantly, the Plaintiffs were not actually bringing a specific corporate
governance suit under the challenged bylaws.32 Instead, the Plaintiffs were
facially challenging the forum selection bylaws themselves by presenting
hypothetical factual scenarios that might make the operation of such bylaws
unreasonable in the future.33 Because the Plaintiffs were making a facial
challenge to the bylaws, the standard of proof required them to show the
“bylaws [could not] operate lawfully or equitably under any circumstances.”34
Because the Plaintiffs “voluntarily assumed this burden by making a facial
validity challenge, [they could not] satisfy it by pointing to some future
hypothetical application of the bylaws that might be impermissible.”35 This was
essentially the nail in the coffin for what would be the Plaintiffs’ fairness or
reasonability argument, as the court concluded “[t]he answer to the possibility
that a statutorily and contractually valid bylaw may operate inequitably in a
particular scenario is for the party facing a concrete situation to challenge the
case-specific application of the bylaw . . . .”36
VII. QUESTIONS ANSWERED: UNILATERALLY ADOPTED FORUM SELECTION
BYLAWS OF THIS KIND ARE STATUTORILY AND CONTRACTUALLY VALID UNDER
DELAWARE LAW
A. Statutory Validity: The Subject Matter of the Forum Selection Bylaws
Was Encompassed by the Broad Language of Section 109(b) of the
Delaware Code
Section 109(b) broadly provides corporate “bylaws may contain any
provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation,
relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its
rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers[,]
or employees.”37 The court’s analysis for statutory validity focused on whether
the bylaws were related to the corporate “affairs” and the “rights” of
stockholders portions of this provision and seemed to reserve the “inconsistent

32
33
34
35
36
37

See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 947–48.
See id. (emphasis removed).
Id. at 948.
Id.
Id.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (West 2010).
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with law” caveat for the contractual validity claim as its substance overlapped.38
First, the court found the forum selection bylaws “plainly” related to the
“conduct of [the corporations’] affairs” because the bylaws provided a procedure
for how to resolve “internal affairs claims” of the corporation.39 The court
explained the importance of this was the decision by the boards to “channel[]
internal affairs cases into the courts of the state of incorporation, [which
provided] for the opportunity to have internal affairs cases resolved
authoritatively by [the Delaware] Supreme Court . . . .”40 In sum, because the
forum selection bylaws were by definition setting the procedure for the
“conduct” of corporate “affairs,” such bylaws furthered a proper statutory
purpose.41
Second, the court similarly found, by “a matter of easy linguistics,” such
bylaws also addressed the “rights” of stockholders.42 According to the court, the
bylaws very clearly related to the “rights or powers” of the stockholders of these
corporations because the bylaws provided the critical limitation of where those
rights may be asserted.43 In an attempt to avoid the seemingly obvious
application of this broad language, the Plaintiffs attempted to make the
distinction that the forum selection bylaws were regulating “external” rights of
the stockholder and not “internal” rights, which were supposed to be the subject
of bylaws under Section 109(b).44
The court declined to draw the external/internal rights distinction at the
court house steps.45 Instead, the court explained the bylaws indeed dealt with
internal stockholder rights because the “right” that was being regulated was the
stockholder’s procedural right to bring suit regarding the internal affairs of the
corporation.46 As the court explained, “[t]hese are the kind of claims most
central to the relationship between those who manage the corporation and the
corporation’s stockholders.”47 The court, however, noted a bylaw might run
afoul of this external right distinction if that “bylaw . . . purported to bind a
plaintiff, even a stockholder plaintiff, who sought to bring a tort claim against
the company based on a personal injury she suffered that occurred on the
company’s premises or a contract claim based on a commercial contract with the
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

See id. at 950–51.
Id. at 951.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 950–51.
See id.
See id. at 951.
See id. at 951–52.
See id.
Id. at 952.
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corporation.”48 The court labeled the distinction as “obvious”—the bylaws in
that hypothetical “would not deal with the rights and powers of the plaintiffstockholder as a stockholder.”49
In sum, the court found the forum selection bylaws proffered by Chevron
and FedEx were valid under Section 109(b) because these bylaws regulated the
“rights” of stockholders as to the “conduct” of internal corporate “affairs.”50
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ claim of statutory invalidity was dismissed.51
B. Contractual Validity: Forum Selection Clause Jurisprudence Will
Apply to the Forum Selection Bylaws Even Though They Were
Unilaterally Adopted by the Boards
The Plaintiffs’ contractual argument was centered on the fact the forum
selection bylaws were established unilaterally by the boards without any consent
from the stockholders.52 Essentially, one party to the forum selection clause had
not bargained for, or even agreed to, the limitation.53 As such, this forum
selection setup did not resemble those traditional contractual situations that have
historically supported a forum selection clause.54 The Plaintiffs argued the
principle of a forum selection bylaw was not per se invalid, but rather such a
restriction of rights must come from a vote opened to the stockholders
themselves to come under traditional forum selection clause consideration.55
The court flatly rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument, explaining it
“misunderst[ood] . . . [and] . . . misapprehend[ed] fundamental principles of
Delaware corporate law.”56 The court explained “generations” of Delaware case
law have established “bylaws constitute a binding part of the contract between a
Delaware corporation and its stockholders.”57 The court reminded Plaintiffs,
when a corporation decides to empower its board to unilaterally adopt or amend
bylaws, stockholders are on notice the board may adopt any bylaw within its
power under Section 109(b).58 Accordingly, the court explained such action by
“the board is not extra-contractual simply because the board acts unilaterally;

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id.
Id.
See id. at 950–54.
Id. at 954.
See id. at 954–55.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 940, 955.
Id. at 955.
Id. at 955–56.
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rather it is the kind of change that the overarching statutory and contractual
regime the stockholders buy into explicitly allows the board to make on its
own.”59
[T]he Chevron and FedEx stockholders have assented to a
contractual framework established by the DGCL and the certificates
of incorporation that explicitly recognizes that stockholders will be
bound by bylaws adopted unilaterally by their boards. Under that
clear contractual framework, the stockholders assent to not having to
assent to board-adopted bylaws. The [P]laintiffs’ argument that
stockholders must approve a forum selection bylaw for it to be
contractually binding is an interpretation that contradicts the plain
terms of the contractual framework chosen by stockholders who buy
stock in Chevron and FedEx.60
The court concluded, under this reasoning, the forum selection bylaws
established by Chevron and FedEx were indeed contractually valid and
contractually binding.61 Thus, the Plaintiffs’ contractual validity claim was also
dismissed.62 This finding was important in and of itself to establish the binding
nature of the bylaw; however, it was perhaps even more important because with
contractual validity comes the opportunity to apply traditional forum selection
clause jurisprudence to the bylaw itself.63 This opportunity would normally
have presented the Plaintiffs with a renewed chance to invalidate the bylaws on
reasonability or fairness grounds—that is, had the Plaintiffs not presented a
facial challenge.
VIII. QUESTIONS THAT REMAIN FOR FUTURE COURTS: DO FORUM SELECTION
BYLAWS OF THIS KIND OPERATE IN A “REASONABLE” MANNER?
A. Survey of Forum Selection Clause Jurisprudence
Since the forum selection bylaws at issue in Boilermakers were statutorily
and contractually valid, the court explained “the bylaws will also be subject to
scrutiny under the principles for evaluating contractual forum selection clauses
established by the Supreme Court of the United States in The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., and adopted by our Supreme Court.”64 This “scrutiny” is not one
that creates a barrier for forum selection bylaws. To the contrary, it is a scrutiny
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 956.
Id.
See id. at 958.
Id.
See id. at 957.
Id.
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that propels such bylaws onto very solid ground.
B. Presumptive Validity
In Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Oil Co., the United States Supreme Court
officially ushered in the era of the “forum selection clause”.65 The Court
observed forum selection clauses had been historically disfavored by American
courts, with many courts having declined “to enforce such clauses on the ground
that they were ‘contrary to public policy,’ or that their effect was to ‘oust the
jurisdiction’ of the court.”66 The Court, however, decided to adopt a more
“hospitable attitude toward forum-selection clauses” by establishing federal
courts should find forum selection clauses are “prima facie valid” and
enforceable “unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be
‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.”67
The Court in Bremen reasoned such a rule “accords with ancient concepts
of freedom of contract and reflects an appreciation of the expanding horizons of
American contractors who seek business in all parts of the world.”68 The Court
concluded “in the light of present-day commercial realities and expanding
international trade[,] . . . the forum clause should control absent a strong
showing that it should be set aside.”69 The general federal rule that emerged
from Bremen was “a freely negotiated private international agreement,
unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power . . .
should be given full effect.”70 This rule was adopted by the Supreme Court of
Delaware in Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc.71
C. Forum Selection Clauses Remain Broadly Enforceable Even Without
Bargaining Power or Negotiation
The context of the forum selection clause in Bremen was a contract
between two corporations by way of “arm’s-length negotiation by experienced
and sophisticated businessmen.”72 In Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, the United
States Supreme Court remained highly favorable to the enforceability of a forum
selection clause even where the forum selection clause was between a large

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

M/S Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Oil Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9–10, n.10 (citations omitted).
Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 15.
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591 (1991) (citing Bremen, U.S. at 12–13).
Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1146 (Del. 2010).
See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 1, 12.
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international cruise line and a private couple who had purchased cruise tickets.73
In Carnival, the Court assumed the couple’s “contract was purely routine and
doubtless nearly identical to every commercial passage contract issued by
[Carnival] and most other cruise lines.”74 Therefore, it was assumed, like every
other ordinary passenger, the couple was not able to negotiate the terms of the
forum selection clause in the ticket.75
The Court in Carnival explained there were at least three policy rationales
that supported the holding a forum selection clause should remain presumptively
valid in this situation, even where bargaining power was non-existent for one
party to the contract.76 First, “a cruise line has a special interest in limiting the
fora in which it potentially could be subject to suit” because a cruise line
“typically carries passengers from many locales” and, therefore, opens itself to
litigation in “several different fora.”77 Second, a forum selection clause prevents
confusion about the proper forum and, therefore, spares litigants and courts from
having to resolve motions relating to the proper location of the lawsuit.78 Third,
the Court assumed “passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum clause
. . . benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line
enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued.”79
D. Fundamental Fairness Scrutiny
More importantly, the Court found the forum selection clause in Carnival
further passed required judicial scrutiny for “fundamental fairness.”80 The Court
in Carnival essentially established a breach of “fundamental fairness” in the
context of a forum selection clause would be a manifest intent to select a forum
that would “discourag[e]” customers from pursuing litigation.81 The Court in
Carnival found that four factors present in the case belied an intent to
discourage suit.82 First, Carnival had its principal place of business—
headquarters—in the designated forum.83 Second, Carnival conducted a

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Carnival, 499 U.S. at 587, 593–95.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id. at 593–94.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 593–94.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 595.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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substantial amount of business in the designated forum.84 Third, there was no
evidence Carnival obtained the couple’s assent to the selection clause by “fraud
or overreaching.”85 Fourth, the couple had “conceded that they were given
notice of the forum provision and, therefore, presumably retained the option of
rejecting the contract with impunity.”86
IX. APPLICATION OF FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE REASONABILITY AND FAIRNESS
PRINCIPLES TO A FORUM SELECTION BYLAW OF THIS KIND
A. The Court Refused to Apply Hypotheticals in a Facial Challenge
As was explained above, the court in Boilermakers refused to address the
Plaintiffs’ “conjured up” hypotheticals to determine if the bylaws were
unreasonable or otherwise lacked fundamental fairness because this was a facial
challenge.87 The court explained “as-applied challenges to the reasonableness of
a forum selection clause should be made by a real plaintiff whose real case is
affected by the operation of the forum selection clause.”88
B. The Unilateral Nature of a Forum Selection Bylaw Will Not Render It
Unreasonable or Fundamentally Unfair
Whereas the court did not wander into applying the Plaintiffs’
hypotheticals to determine the reasonability of the forum selection bylaws, the
court did apply the unilateral nature of the Carnival forum selection clause to
the case in supporting the fundamental fairness of such a bylaw.89 The court in
Boilermakers analogized the forum selection bylaws that were unilaterally
adopted after the stockholder purchased the stock to the Carnival context in
which the forum selection clause “was not subject to negotiation and was printed
on the ticket [that the plaintiff] received after she purchased the passage . . . .”90
The court in Boilermakers opined, because the United States Supreme Court had
found such a forum selection clause “reasonable” and “enforceable,” so too
should it find the forum selection bylaw was reasonable.91 The court explained
the Boilermakers context was likely even more reasonable than that of Carnival

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id.
Id.
Id.
Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
Id. at 941.
See id. at 957–58.
Id. at 957.
See id.
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because “stockholders retain the right to modify the corporation’s bylaws.”92
C. Potential Fairness and Reasonability Applications Remain for Future
Cases
The court’s conclusion in Boilermakers that forum selection clause
jurisprudence applies to forum selection bylaws goes a very long way towards
securing the practice. Notably, however, the court made it a point to conclude
its opinion by securing the opportunity for future plaintiffs to bring as-applied
challenges to the reasonability or fairness of such bylaws.93 Some of these
challenges may be bolstered by Carnival itself and its fundamental fairness
analysis.
Unlike Carnival, the corporations in this case, and undoubtedly many like
it, designate a litigation state—Delaware—in which the corporations are not
actually headquartered or do a substantial percentage of their business.94 Should
the fundamental fairness that was found for Carnival’s unilateral forum selection
in that case apply to a forum selection bylaw that requires litigation so far from
the actual beating heart of the corporation itself? Would not the same
multiforum litigation concerns be avoided by designating the forum where the
corporation is actually headquartered? Indeed, selection of the state of
headquarters might arguably be the best, if not only, evidence the corporation’s
motivation for the bylaw was efficiency and not limiting litigation to a favorable
forum to potentially discourage suit. On the other hand, a strong argument
could be made that the unique procedures that exist in the Court of Chancery
and the ability to have Delaware courts set precedent for the corporate law that
governs the corporation, should carry substantial weight in proving a good faith
motivation. These, and many other such factors, need further analysis alongside
the actual facts of an as-applied challenge in the future.
X. CONCLUSION
Boilermakers set substantial precedent supporting the validity of forum
selection bylaws under Delaware law.95 Such forum selection bylaws are valid
under Section 109(b) and are not otherwise invalid as a matter of contract law.96
Accordingly, Delaware courts will apply the traditional prima facie presumption

92

Id. at 957–58.
See id. at 963.
94
Compare Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 942–43, with Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S.
585, 595 (1991).
95
See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 954, 958.
96
See id.
93
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of validity to such forum selection bylaws, subject to a reasonability and
fundamental fairness inquiry reserved for as-applied factual challenges.97
Boilermakers has the makings of a case that sets fundamental corporate law for
generations to come. Undoubtedly, Boilermakers has been, and will continue to
be, the subject of many board room discussions amongst Delaware corporations
who must answer what has become a very important question, Where do we
want to let our stockholders challenge corporate action? Or, perhaps more
importantly, which court are we comfortable with deciding these challenges?

97

See id. at 957–58.

